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Abstract
In this paper we explore the e®ects of the minimum pension program on welfare and
retirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient
analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security
to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced
by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there
is threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of ¯rst entitlement) with respect to the
economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost
50% larger.
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It is generally agreed that the aging of the population represents a major challenge to the
¯nancial sustainability of current Pay As You Go (PAYG) Social Security Systems. This has led
most OECD countries to reform their pension regulations, trying to reduce their generosity and
to provide older workers with larger incentives to remain in the labor force. This state of a®airs
has spurred academic economists to explore the e®ects of pension rules on individual behavior
and on the aggregate performance of the economy. We contribute to that e®ort by exploring
the welfare and behavioral impact of minimum pension schemes, with special emphasis on their
labor supply consequences. Either in the form of minimum guaranteed bene¯ts in earning-related
schemes (of the type commonly found in continental Europe) or as the basic bene¯ts in °at-rate
pension systems (frequently found in Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries, with the exception of
US), the presence of minimum pensions is a remarkable regularity all over OECD economies1.
See Kalisch and Aman (1998) for a thorough review of pension regulations in OECD countries.
The Spanish pension system is a case in point. In this country, 37.6 % of the contributive old-
age pensions were topped up under the minimum pension scheme in 1999. In that year these
minimum pension supplements represented 8.5 % of disposable pension income for men, and
15.2% for women. Successive governments have granted widespread support to the program on
the grounds of its popular re-distributive properties, to the point of letting its value grow beyond
that of the minimum wage, from year 2000 onwards. In contrast, its disincentive side-e®ects
have received very little attention. Its tendency to exacerbate the pre-retirement of low-income
workers is a paramount example: in our sample of Social Security administrative records almost
70 % of people retiring at the age of 60 were enjoying a top up of their pensions. This has been
no obstacle for recent reforms to increase the program's generosity and to weaken its eligibility
conditions2.
In this paper we quantitatively assess the impact of the Spanish pension rules, especially the
minimum pension scheme, on the retirement and savings patterns of Spanish workers. This task
is undertaken with the help of a life cycle model with an endogenous retirement decision and the
prohibition to borrow from future pension income. This model is used as the data generating
process in a structural maximum likelihood estimation, carried out over a unique, very large
sample of labor records obtained from the Spanish Social Security administration (HLSS).
Our paper has connections with a number of di®erent strands of the literature. First, it has
obvious links with the (by now) very large literature that explores the e±ciency properties of
di®erent pension designs. In our view, the e®ects of minimum pensions on savings and labor
supply have receive relatively little attention so far, although we do not try to elaborate this
1In countries like Germany, where minimum pensions are formally missing, it is common to ¯nd some form of
minimum guaranteed bene¯t, legislated in an indirect way (like eg. minimum contributions rules).
2The 2002 amendment to the 1997 reform extended the right to early retire to all the employees, abolishing








intuition, as the number of works involved is simply too large to be properly revised here. Instead,
we just mention that the immediate inspiration for this development came from the analysis of
the accruals and implicit tax rates generated by the Spanish pension system in Boldrin et al.
(2004) and Jim¶ enez-Mart¶ ³n and S¶ anchez-Mart¶ ³n (2004).
Our structural estimation exercise is related to the econometric literature on retirement
behavior. The state of the art is represented by the maximum likelihood approach in Rust and
Phelan (1995) and the Method of Simulated Moments implemented in French (2005), French and
Jones (2001) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2002). 3 However, as our data generating process
is a continuous time life-cycle model, our estimation procedure is more closely related to the
study of the strength of bequest motives in Hurd (1989) or to the classical analysis of the e®ects
of wage reductions on partial retirement in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986).4 Note that, since
the Spanish public pension program is universal, the endogeneity of ¯nancial incentives and
the issue of selection into particular pension arrangements are not relevant for our econometric
experiment.
Finally, the e®ect of credit constraints (the prohibition of anticipating the consumption
of future pension °ows) on life cycle savings has been explored in Leung (1994, 2000), while
Crawford and Lilien (1981) Fabel (1994a) discuss its impact on retirement. Our work integrates
both approaches. The resulting model is extremely well suited for exploring the impact of
pension rules on savings and labor supply. More generally, its closed-form optimal behavioral
rules are very convenient for analysis with a strong expositional or computational content. In
this paper we use the model as the data generating process in a maximum likelihood estimation
procedure, assuming the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in the relative value of leisure.
The life-cycle methodology has two main advantages in this context. On the one hand, it largely
avoids the computational burden involved in the estimation of standard Dynamic Programming
Models. On the other hand, the ability to solve the model at any point in the individuals life
cycle is valuable in situations where data on accumulated assets are not available (as is the case
in our estimation database). Unfortunately, this way of working weakens our ability to measure
the relative contribution of minimum pensions and borrowing constraints to early retirement
°ows. The scope of our life-cycle experiment is discussed at length in section 3.3.
Our main ¯ndings can be summarized as follows:
3Rust and Phelan (1997) show that size of the retirement °ows in USA (particularly the discontinuities at the
key ages of the pension system, 62 and 65) can be entirely rationalized on economic grounds. They are the optimal
reply to old-age pension rules, health shocks (in form of out-of-pocket medical costs) and the insurance mechanisms
available for that risk. French (2005) explore retirement behavior within a di®erent estimation framework and
taking optimal savings decision into account. French and Jones (2001) assesses the relative importance of Medicare
and pension rules on the retirement °ows at the age of 65.
4Note, however, that our model and those in Hurd (1989) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) are substantially
di®erent. We rely on the labor supply predictions of the model rather than on the predicted saving behavior in
Hurd's work. With respect to the latter, our model includes life uncertainty, borrowing constraints and discrete








² Our theoretical model shows that minimum pensions create very strong incentives for
low-income workers to leave the labor force as soon as they become ¯rst available.
² When taken to the data, our model does a satisfactory job in reproducing actual empirical
behavior.
² Our calibrated simulations reveal a very signi¯cant quantitative impact for minimum pen-
sions: the incidence of retirement at the age of ¯rst entitlement (60) almost triples with
respect to that in the economy without minimum pensions. Total early retirement (before
or at 60) is almost 50% larger with minimum pensions. Welfare gains for the a®ected
individuals can also be quite large.
² In our basic life-cycle framework prohibiting borrowing from future pensions has very little
impact on retirement incentives. This suggests that our approach may overstate the role of
minimum pensions in fostering early retirement. We simulate a model with heterogeneous
discount factors to check the robustness of our main ¯nding, with positive results.
² Finally, our model predicts a strong behavioral response to the labor-incentive package
introduced in 2002, combining pension bonuses and the elimination of contributions for
people working beyond 65. The e®ectiveness of this reform package can be strengthen by
combining it with a delay in the age when minimum pension is ¯rst available.
Although our ¯ndings are speci¯c to the Spanish case, they surely apply more broadly.
For instance, for countries with °at-rate pension schemes or in the assessment of proposals to
privatize the current PAYG systems, which normally include some form of minimum bene¯t
guarantee. Even in countries where the access to the minimum is delayed until the normal
retirement age (like France and US), this mechanism could result in low income workers leaving
the workforce early, as they correctly anticipate their catching up with the minimum bene¯t in
a few years time.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the Spanish pension rules, and
present some key facts. In section 3 we introduce our life cycle model, brie°y review its basic
theoretical predictions and discuss its adequacy for the purposes of the paper. Section 4 deals
with the structural estimation experiment. Firstly, we describe how to use the life cycle model
as a data generating process; then we present the maximum likelihood estimations and comment
on the properties of the preferences revealed throughout the experiment. Our main experiment
(the quanti¯cation of the e®ects of minimum pensions) is reported in section 5. The role of
borrowing constraints, the robustness of our results and the e®ects of several changes in current
pension rules are also explored there. Section 6 concludes with some ¯nal remarks. At the end
of the paper, several appendices enlarge the main text substantially, by getting into additional








2 Minimum pensions and retirement behavior
In this section we brie°y review the basic features of the Spanish pension system, and explore
the main labor supply patterns for older workers.
2.1 Spanish Old Age pension rules
Public pensions is the largest welfare program in Spain, absorbing almost 70 % of the total social
protection expenditure, and representing around 10% of GDP in 2001. The system is of the Pay
As You Go, De¯ned Bene¯t type. It provides ¯ve types of contributory pensions (old age,
disability, widows and widowers, orphans and other relatives), and is organized around three
basic schemes: the General Regime (private sector employees and some public servants), the
Central Government civil servants Scheme, and some Special Regimes, with the Self-employed
Scheme being the most important one. In this paper we deal with old age pensions granted by
the General Regime, which covers around 74 % of the total,
Financing: The System is ¯nanced through contributions from employers and employees. Con-
tributions are a ¯xed proportion of gross labor income between an upper and a lower limit
(contribution bases), which are annually ¯xed and vary according to the professional category.
The current contribution rates are 23.6 and 4.7 %, for employers and employees, respectively.
Pension formula: Eligibility requires a minimum of 8 years of contributions (15 after the
1997 reform) and complete withdrawal from the labor force. The initial amount is obtained by
multiplying a bene¯t base and a replacement rate. The bene¯t base is a moving average of the
individual's contribution bases in the 8 years immediately before retirement (15 after the 1997
system). The replacement rate depends on age and the number of years of contributions. An
individual receives 100% of the bene¯t base if he retires at the age of 65 (Normal Retirement
Age, ¿N) having contributed for more than 35 years. It is possible to start collecting the pension
at the Early Retirement Age (ERA, 60 in Spain) under a 40% penalty on the bene¯t base. This
corresponds to an 8% annual penalty for bringing forward the retirement age (7% with 40 years
of contribution after 1997).5 There is also a penalty for insu±cient contributions (2 % of the
bene¯t base per year below 35 years) The purchasing power of the initial bene¯t is kept constant
according to the evolution of the CPI.
Minimum and maximum pensions: There are lower and upper limits on the pension bene¯t.
Their values in 2000 were roughly equal to and four times the minimum wage respectively. The
minimum pension varies in presence of a dependent spouse and/or with age brackets, since it
is greater for individuals above 65. They are compatible with early retirement, as they can
be awarded immediately after the ERA. In 1999 almost 35% of the stock of old age pensions
were topped up to the guaranteed minimum (23.7% in the General Regime), while the incidence
of maximum pensions was much lower. Historically the behavior of both limits, which are
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Figure 1: Minimum Pension for married individuals aged 65+ and Minimum Wage (\Salario M¶ ³nimo
Interprofesional"): log of real values in 1976{2004.
annually ¯xed by the government, has been very di®erent: while maximum pensions have been
kept roughly constant in real terms over the last 15 years, minimum pensions have grown at
approximately the same rate as nominal wages. As a result of this policy, the minimum pension
(for married individuals aged 65+) is larger that the legislated Minimum Wage since 2000, and
that their values have continued to diverge ever since.
2.2 Labor supply patterns of older workers in Spain
Most Spanish workers withdraw from the labor force either at the ERA (60) or at the NRA
(65). This results in sharp discontinuities in the empirical retirement hazard at the pension
system's key ages (¯gure 2). This is a very robust empirical pattern, shared by most countries
running PAYG, De¯ned Bene¯t (DB) pension systems.6 Figure 3 explores the composition of
the hazard peaks according to the labor income of the worker. It displays a non-parametric
estimation of the retirement hazard at some selected ages (59, 60 and 65), as a function of the
expected labor income at the age of 60. We ¯nd striking di®erences. The probability of leaving
the labor force at the ERA is a clearly decreasing function of the salary level, while it is virtually
°at at the other ages (although, logically, at very di®erent levels). These patterns are basically
6Our data come from a sample of administrative records from the Spanish Social Security in 1995, see the
section D of the appendix, but virtually identical patterns can be found in all other available databases (the
European Household Panel (ECHP), the Family Income Survey (EPF) or the Labour Force Survey (EPA)). Cross
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Figure 2: Retirement hazard by age in the full sample and in the subsamples of workerst that qualify
and fail-to-qualify for the minimum bene¯t (MP). Source: HLSS, 1995
independent of the educational achievement of the individual.7 It means that most early retirees
are low-income workers who qualify for a minimum pension top-up. We also ¯nd that 67.7% of
the people who retire at the exact age of 60 are actually receiving the minimum complement.
Finally, it is quite revealing that the retirement hazard at the age of 60 for those a®ected by the
minimum pension is 5 times larger than that for those who do not receive it (see ¯gure 2).
An informal explanation of the empirical regularities
To explore the incentives underlying the pension regulations imagine a worker who decides to
stay working at a speci¯c age ¿. He faces two marginal disincentives for doing so: the reduction
in leisure time and, provided the eligibility conditions are met, the foregone pension bene¯t. On
the other hand, staying working allows the individual to collect a salary and implies a change in
the pension bene¯t he is entitled to in the future. This latter change depends on two elements.
Firstly, delaying retirement in the age range f¿m;:::;¿Ng reduces the early retirement penalty
(and the insu±cient contributions penalty, if the number of years of contribution is lower than
35). Secondly, the bene¯t base changes as current gross labor income moves into the averaging
period and substitutes the value observed 8 years before (15 years under the 1997 system). Note
that while the ¯rst e®ect always results in higher bene¯ts, the concavity of the life cycle pro¯les
of labor income can result in the second having the opposite e®ect.
7The education level is not observable in our sample of social security records, but can be approximated by
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Percentile of the expected wage at 60
Figure 3: Retirement hazard at key ages (59, 60, 65) by level of education and expected wage
at age 60. Source: HLSS, 1988{1995
Keeping all this in mind, it is not di±cult to explain the peaks in retirement hazard. The age
65 peak is an optimal reply to (1) the lack of an actuarial adjustment of pension bene¯ts after
the NRA, (2) the drop in the bene¯t base induced by labor income dynamics at such advanced
ages, (3) the low incentive provided by a decreased salary and (4) the fact that the opportunity
cost of the foregone pension typically reaches its maximum at that age. It is also quite easy to
rationalize the ERA peak of Spanish workers as a result of the minimum pension mechanism.
As the size of the minimum pension is independent from the individual's circumstances, it
completely eliminates the incentives to work due to the pension formula. In particular, it
wipes out the strong incentives associated with the early retirement penalties, while increasing
the opportunity cost of the foregone pension. Boldrin et al. (2004) and Jim¶ enez-Mart¶ ³n and
S¶ anchez-Mart¶ ³n (2004) assess the strength of the incentives provided by the minimum pensions
by computing their associated accruals and implicit tax rates. There is, however, no previous
evaluation of the optimal behavioral response to these incentives. That assessment is undertaken
in the next section.
3 The behavioral model
Our behavioral model is an extension of the standard life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumber








This credit constraint is relevant in the absence of a bequest motive, an aspect ¯rst established
in Yaari (1965) and treated thoroughly in Leung (2000). We follow this latter paper in the
treatment of the model with a ¯xed retirement age, while our analysis of the retirement decision
is similar to that in Crawford and Lilien (1981) and Fabel (1994b).
Time in the model (ie, the age of the individual) is represented by t, while T stands for the
length of the individual life. T is a continuous random variable distributed on [t0;T] according
to the survival function S(:) and mortality hazard h(:)8. The length of life is the only source
of uncertainty included in the model. We consider an individual of age t0 and study his/her
optimal decisions for what remains of the life-cycle. Their preferences for consumption, c(t) :
[t0;T] ! R+ and leisure, l¿(t) : [t0;T] ! [0;1] (with l¿(t) = 1 8t 2 [¿;T], ie. taking ¿ as the





e¡± (t¡t0) À(c(t); l¿(t)) dt
where ± is a discount factor. The period utility function is also additively separable in its two
arguments: À(c;l) = u(c(t)) + º(l(t)), with both components exhibiting the usual properties.9
Individuals choose the consumption path and the retirement age ¿ that maximize expected utility
under the constraints imposed by two market imperfections: the lack of an insurance market
for life uncertainty (i.e. the absence of private annuities) and the prohibition of borrowing from
future pension income (i.e., accumulated assets a(t) must not be negative after retirement in
order to avoid people dying with standing debts).
Working individuals receive a gross labor income w(t) and must pay social contributions
at a constant rate &.10 After retirement, the consumer's income consists of a °ow of pension
bene¯ts, b(t;¿), which depends on both age and the retirement age as discussed in section 2.1.
We also assume that there is no bequest motive for savings and that the public sector fully
taxes involuntary bequests. For the sake of simplicity we abstract from private pensions (quite
irrelevant in the Spanish case), work with a constant real interest rate, r, and take the life
cycle pro¯le of labor hours l(t) as exogenously ¯xed. The formal statement of the intertemporal
problem is, then, as follows:
8We assume that h(t) > 0 8[0;T] and limt!T h(t) = 1. Applying standard results it is easy to express








9They are twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing and concave. We also assume that
limc!0 u
0(c(t)) = 1.
10In this section we omit some of the institutional details to ease the exposition. For a complete record of the








max E[V (c;l)] =
R T
t0 e¡± (t¡t0) S(t) [u(c(t)) + º(l¿(t))] dt
c(t); a(t); ¿ st _ a(t) = ra(t) + ~ w(t;¿) ¡ c(t)
~ w(t;¿) = w(t)(1 ¡ &)I(t0;¿) + b(t;¿)I(¿;T)
l¿(t) = l(t)I(t0;¿) + 1I(¿;T)
a(t0) = a0 a(T) = 0 a(t) ¸ 0 8 t ¸ ¿
(1)
where I(t1;t2) is the indicator function for the event t 2 [t1;t2].
Under the previous assumptions, the borrowing constraint always becomes binding before the
maximum life span (see proposition 1 in Leung (2000)). We denote this \wealth depletion time"
by t 2 [^ ¿;T), where ^ ¿ = maxf¿m;¿g (ie. the maximum between the ERA and the individual
retirement age). Following Crawford and Lilien (1981) and Fabel (1994b) we use this result to




t0 e¡~ ±(t)u(c(t)) dt +
R T
t e¡~ ±(t)u(b(t;¿)) dt +
R T
t0 e¡~ ±(t)º(l¿(t)) dt
c(t); ¿;a(t); t st. a0(t) = ra(t) + ~ w(t;¿) ¡ c(t) t 2 [t0;t]
~ w(t;¿) = w(t)(1 ¡ &)I(t0;¿) + b(t;¿)I(¿;T)
t 2 [^ ¿;T) l¿(t) = l(t)I(t0;¿) + 1I(¿;T) ^ ¿ = maxf¿m;¿g
a(t0) = a0 a(t) = 0 t 2 [t;T]
(2)
where e
~ ±(t) is a shorthand notation for S(t)e± (t¡t0). We deal with this problem in three stages.
Firstly, we analytically characterize the optimal pro¯les of consumption and accumulated assets
for a given retirement age and a given binding age for the credit constraint. As this is a well
known step, we leave the algebraic details and a calibrated example to appendix A.1. Using
these conditional solutions we compute, in a second stage, the optimal binding age for any given
retirement age. Finally, we employ the information of the previous two stages to characterize
the optimal retirement age. A detailed discussion of the entire procedure is available in Jim¶ enez-
Mart¶ ³n and S¶ anchez-Mart¶ ³n (2003).
3.1 Optimal retirement behavior
After the ¯rst two stages of our solution procedure we are left with the optimal unconditional
consumption function, c¿(t), and optimal binding age t(¿) for any ¯xed retirement age. We can
then characterize what the individual envisages as the optimal retirement behavior (given the








e¡~ ±(t) u(c¿(t))dt +
Z T
t(¿)
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Figure 4: Marginal utility of working by age for the Spanish median worker. We separately
show marginal changes in life cycle wealth ¸e¡r ¿ y0(¿), and the total marginal change implied,
including the impact of leisure reductions.
e
~ ±(t) is a shorthand notation for S(t)e± (t¡t0). Some discontinuities introduced by the pension
regulations (see below) imply that V (¿) is only piecewise continuously di®erentiable. Therefore,
local optimum ¿¤ can be either interior (dV
d¿ (¿¤) = 0 and d 2 V
d¿ 2 (¿¤) < 0), or corner solutions, i.e.,
ages where the marginal utility of working changes its sign in a discrete, negative drop. Therefore,
¯nding the best retirement age involves a comparison among the utility levels achieved in local
optima and corner solutions.
In our life cycle context, the optimal retirement is driven by a relatively simple income/leisure
trade-o®. This can be shown by exploring the marginal utility of staying employed at age ¿:
dV
d¿
(¿) = ¸e¡r (¿¡t0) y0(¿) ¡ e¡~ ±(¿) ¢º(¿) (4)
where ¸ is the lagrange multiplier associated with the implicit Intertemporal Budget Constraint,
y0(¿) is the current value of the marginal changes in ¿-conditional life cycle wealth, and
¢º(¿) = º(1) ¡ º(l¿) (5)
is the current utility cost of the foregone leisure. Note that pension rules have a critical in°uence
on retirement by shaping the evolution of y0(:) with the retirement age, as we review in the next
section.
3.2 The e®ects of pension rules on individual behavior
By staying in the workforce at age ¿, the individual's life cycle wealth is modi¯ed in three








reception of pension bene¯ts being deferred for at least one period (assuming the individual
meets the eligibility criteria). On the other hand, the pension bene¯t the worker is entitled to
receive in the future changes. This latter e®ect can be very important, as it alters the income
to be perceived at every single year after retirement. The analytical expression of these changes
is given by:
y0(¿) = w(¿)(1 ¡ &) ¡ b I(¿ ¸ ¿m) + b0 ~ A(^ ¿;t) (6)
where I(:) is a standard indicator function and ~ A(^ ¿;t) captures the e®ect, accumulated over the
individual's entire remaining life, of marginal changes in the bene¯t:
~ A(^ ¿;t) =
Z t
^ ¿
e¡r(t¡¿) dt + e¡r(t¡¿)
Z T
t
e¡(~ ±(t)¡~ ±(t)) dt
The ¯rst term represents the impact along the interior optimal consumption path, while the
second captures the direct impact of changes in b in the utility function after the optimal wealth
depletion age.11
Notice that the second term vanishes under perfect capital markets. The trade o® is slightly
di®erent in the presence of corner solutions, i.e. when c¿(¿j¿) < b(¿). However, as this is not a
very common situation, we have con¯ned the details to appendix B, where a general expression
for the marginal utility of working is presented.
The incentives the pension rules create for an average Spanish worker (characterized by a
concave wage pro¯le) are displayed in ¯gure 4 and can be summarized as follows:
² Before the ERA, ¿m, workers have very signi¯cant incentives to keep working, stemming
basically from a relatively high salary and the fact that they do not su®er the marginal
cost of the foregone pension (this is revealed by the indicator function, I(¿ ¸ ¿m), in (6)).
² In the age range [¿m;¿N) individuals have strong incentives to keep working. This is a
direct consequence of the early retirement penalties: by staying employed, individuals are
granted the equivalent of an 8% annual increase in the replacement rate. This more than
o®sets the opportunity cost of the foregone pension, resulting in a positive jump in the
marginal utility of working along this time interval.
² Once the individual reaches the NRA, that is, when there are no further premia for delaying
retirement, the incentive to work vanishes (recall the arguments given in section 2.2)



















by using the ¯rst order condition for optimal consumption e
¡±(t)u
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Figure 5: Income and substitution e®ects induced by the minimum pension scheme on a worker
in the 10th quantile of the income distribution.
3.2.1 The e®ects of the minimum pension scheme
Low-income workers qualify for a top up of their old age pensions to the annually legislated guar-
anteed minimum. This results in substantially di®erent retirement incentives to those described
in the previous section. The marginal change in life cycle wealth is now:
y0(¿) = w(¿)(1 ¡ &) ¡ bmI(¿ ¸ ¿m) (7)
It is most apparent that the minimum pension increases the opportunity cost of the forgone
pension income and utterly eliminates the incentive to work due to the early retirement penalties.
These two e®ects make it optimal for most low-income workers to retire at the earliest possible
age (i.e., the ERA). The magnitude of this substitution e®ect can be fully appreciated in the
right upper panel of ¯gure 5, which shows the age pro¯le of marginal changes in life cycle wealth
for a worker in the 10th quantile of the income distribution, with and without the minimum
pension scheme. Minimum pensions also have an income e®ect, as they e®ectively increase the
individuals' life cycle wealth. This is re°ected in the optimality condition (4) through lower
values of the lagrange multiplier ¸, which also weaken the incentive to keep working in the
pre-retirement ages (left top panel of ¯gure 5). The overall impact on the marginal utility can
be appreciated in the bottom panels of ¯gure 5.
Workers in higher quantiles of the earnings distribution may not be entitled to any top up








if the real value of the minimum pension goes up as the individual gets older. The marginal
changes in life-cycle wealth when the minimum pension becomes binding at the age J(¿) > ^ ¿,
takes the form:
y0(¿) = w(¿)(1 ¡ &) ¡ bI(¿ ¸ ¿m) + b0 ~ A(^ ¿;J(¿)) (8)
This is clearly an intermediate case: minimum pensions weaken the incentive e®ects stemming
from age penalties, but do not make them disappear altogether.
3.3 The applicability of the life cycle model
Although conceptually simple, the model developed in this section is a quite powerful analyt-
ical device. It allows for a very tractable exploration of the impact of pension rules, taxes,
life-cycle pro¯les of labor productivity, survival probabilities and individual preferences (relative
consumption/leisure value, the degree of risk aversion and time impatience) on a range of indi-
vidual decisions (retirement, savings and, in a slightly generalized version of the model, hours
worked).
The ability of the model to deliver closed-form analytical expressions makes it specially well
suited for dealing with tasks with a strong computational or expositional content. Key for this
tractability is, of course, the lack of consideration of any form of recursive uncertainty. This
makes the model an unlikely candidate to analyze questions where time-changing uncertainty
plays a central role. For questions hinging upon more permanent individual characteristics, in
contrast, the model has serious advantages with respect to more standard (by now) dynamic
programming methods. Consider, for instance, di®erences in labor income for individuals of sim-
ilar observable characteristics like age, gender or education. They re°ect recursive shocks (like
shocks to their personal health or shocks to their sector of occupation) and more permanent dif-
ferences associated with the average productivity of the individual, the educational background
or the speci¯c investments made right after the entrance in the labor market (specially in coun-
tries with very small labor mobility like Spain). From an ex-ante viewpoint, minimum pensions
provide insurance for the latter type of variability, leading to a classical moral hazard problem.12
The life cycle model provides an environment where the trade o® between the insurance e®ect
of minimum pensions and the distortions induced in savings and labor supply can be easily
measured. We do not pursue this line any further here (to keep our analysis within reasonable
length), but that is an area where the life-cycle model has clear competitive advantages with
respect to other methods.
12Minimum pensions have only a marginal role in providing insurance against health shocks, as there is a
speci¯c scheme covering those shocks in the Spanish legislation (\pensiones de incapacidad laboral transitoria o
permanente"). But other forms of income risk are undoubtedly hedged with the help of minimum pensions. The








3.3.1 Assessing the impact of minimum pensions with the life cycle model
In this paper we apply the life cycle model for a relatively modest endeavor: to quantify the
isolated impact of minimum pensions on welfare and retirement behavior, with special emphasis
on early withdrawals from the labor force. This demands some additional clari¯cation. The evi-
dence presented in section 2.2 makes clear that °at pensions provide a plausible explanation for
the spike in retirement hazard observed at the ¯rst pensionable age. However, it is traditionally
argued that the large retirement °ows at that particular age are largely due to credit constrained
individuals.13 In these circumstances the more natural next step seems to be to measure the
relative contribution of both elements (which is of obvious importance for eg. policy purposes).
Unfortunately, such an experiment is very di±cult to undertake with the empirical information
available in Spain. The main problem is the lack of data on asset holdings that can be combined
with our database of Social Security administrative records. Note that it is only now (2006) that
the results of the very ¯rst survey of asset holding by Spanish families (Encuesta Financiera de
las Familias, EFF02) has been made available. It is, then, extremely di±cult to impute this
missing variable in our (or any other) structural econometric analysis.
In these circumstances two alternatively paths seem possible: (i) to remain within the re-
cursive approach by resorting to a simulation-type estimator combined with some parametric
assumptions on the form of the unobserved heterogeneity; or (ii) to abandon the sequential
methodology altogether and follow a life cycle approach. This second route is attractive because
life cycle models provide a theoretically consistent way around the problem: evaluate the retire-
ment incentives at the age of entrance in the labor market, ie. at a point in life when we can
assume that ¯nancial wealth is negligible. That's the approach we follow in this paper (ie, we
set t0 to 20 years and a0 to 0 in the model of the previous section).
The downside of proceeding in this way is that the role of credit constraints at the end
of the working life is very much diminished. This is (as explored in detail in section 5.2) the
product of the lack of shocks in the economy and the rational long term planning implicit in
the life-cycle model. The results of experiments in section 5.2.1 show that solving the model at
the beginning of the working career makes it very hard to measure the relative contributions of
credit constraints and minimum pensions to early retirement. 14 But we can still assess the
13The rationale is that, with no loans available, workers without enough accumulated assets have hardly any
option but to keep working until the age when the pension is ¯rst available. As pointed out by Hurd (1989),
page 592, \someone on the basis of lifetime wealth and the wage rate may desire to retire at 61; but if he cannot
¯nance consumption at 61 he will wait to retire at 62. He is liquidity constrained" (note that 62 is the ERA
in the USA). Structural econometric models point to borrowing constraints as the major force leading to early
retirement because in these models retirement decisions are taken conditionally on the observed accumulated
assets, and empirical data show a signi¯cant fraction of older workers with very little ¯nancial wealth.
14It is important to emphasize that this results does not stem from the model itself, but from the combination
of very long term planning and homogeneity in the discount factor. When we compute the optimal decisions
immediately before the ERA for individuals lacking enough accumulated wealth, we ¯nd that it is actually better








incidence of early retirement with and without the minimum pension and check the robustness
of our ¯ndings. More precisely, our main experiment in this paper is as follows. We ¯rst extend
the life-cycle model by considering one simple form of unobserved heterogeneity (the individual
value of leisure); We then use the resulting probabilistic model as the data generating process
for the estructural estimation of the preference parameters in the model; Finally, we compute
how much early retirement is generated by the minimum pension in the life-cycle model (section
5.1). The robustness of these ¯ndings to the indirect omission of the impact of credit constraints
is tested via simulations in section 5.2.
4 Econometric estimation of the preference parameters
In this section we design a method to recover the preference parameters by comparing optimal
retirement (as predicted by the previous section's theoretical model) with actual retirement
data (from our HLSS database, which is described in appendix D). We start by reporting
the way we introduce variability in individual retirement ages, by assuming a speci¯c form of
unobserved heterogeneity in the population. We then describe the details of our maximum
likelihood estimation procedure, present the results obtained and discuss their implications.
4.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
In order to introduce variation in the retirement decisions of individuals who are identical in
their observable characteristics, we assume a distribution of the unobservable relative value of
leisure across the population. In particular, we assume that the value attached to the additional
leisure obtained when the individual retires (ie. the change in the leisure term in the age-¿
utility function (5), is a linear function of some observable characteristics and a time invariant,
individual-speci¯c shock ":
¢º(¿) = ¢ºD(¿) + " " » F"(:)
where F" stands for the population distribution of " across the members of each cohort, and
¢ºD(t) is a deterministic component which depends on observable characteristics. Therefore,
the marginal utility of working (@V=@¿)(¿), expressed in current value terms and denoted here-
after by Á(¿), can be split into a deterministic and a stochastic term. Recalling (4):
Á(¿) = ¸e
~ ±(¿)¡r ¿ y0(¿) ¡ ¢ºD(¿) ¡ " = ÁD(¿) ¡ "
Using the optimal retirement conditions in section 3.1, we can establish a functional relationship
between the unobserved \type", ", and the optimal retirement age, ¿:
dynamic programming models. This does not happen with long term planning because rational individuals
do accumulate enough wealth to ¯nance pre-retirement. However, a life-cycle model with heterogeneity in the
discount factor can potentially produce endogenously credit-constrained individuals. A simulation along these










The asterisk reminds us of the need for discarding local optima in order to have a one-to-one
relationship between the two variables. Note that individuals with di®erent observable charac-
teristics will have di®erent age pro¯les of Á¤
D. Finally, a change of variable in the distribution
function of " leads to a (conditional on the observables) distribution law for the stochastic
optimal retirement age. The unconditional probability of being retired at age t or before is then:
F¿(t) = P[¿ · t] = P[Á¤¡1
D (") · t] = P[" ¸ Á¤
D(t)] = 1 ¡ F"(Á¤
D(t)) (9)
This continuous-time speci¯cation becomes operative by making ¿ discrete and considering
the existence of lower and upper limits in the retirement age (¿ and ¿ respectively). Then, from
the viewpoint of the analyst, retirement is a discrete stochastic variable » 2 f¿;¿ + 1;:::;¿g,
distributed according to the following law:
F»(a) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 ¡ F"(Á¤
D(¿)) a = ¿
1 ¡ F"(Á¤
D(a)) a 2 f¿ + 1;:::;¿ ¡ 1g
F"(Á¤
D(¿)) a = ¿
(10)
4.2 Maximum Likelihood estimation method
Using the retirement age distribution (9), we can easily write the likelihood of any vector of















where ti is the age of the individual, di is an indicator function taking value one if the
individual retires and zero otherwise, and Á¤
i(ti) is the individual's deterministic component of
the marginal utility (we make explicit the dependence on the vector of observable characteristics
xi and on the preference parameters).
The model needs to be closed in several dimensions before we can use the previous expression
in a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Firstly, we have to fully specify the individual
utility function. We restrict ourselves to the CES case, u(c) = c1¡´=(1 ¡ ´) and impose the
following linear structure on the deterministic value of leisure:
¢ºD(¿) = º0 + ºt ¿ + ºe d(e) + ºet ¿ d(e) + ºs d(s)
This speci¯cation considers four controls (in addition to a constant): the age ¿, the education
(d(e) is a dummy taking the value of one for highly educated workers and zero otherwise), and








temporary bene¯ts, either related to unemployment or to illness). We also allow for an interac-
tion term between age and education. Consequently, the vector of the preference parameters to
be estimated is µ = (º0;ºe;ºet;ºt;ºs;±;´).
Secondly, we have to specify the economic environment, including the institutional setting,
the wage process, the interest rate, the survival process, the heterogeneity dimensions and their
population distributions. All these elements are speci¯ed as follows:
² The permanent component of the relative value of leisure, ", is assumed to be normally
distributed across individuals: " » N(0;1). This introduces some similarities between our
empirical model and a reduced form probit model. Note, however, that our unobservable
individual type " is permanent rather than the annual shock included in the probit case.
This accounts for the non standard denominator in our likelihood function (11).
Table 1: Stylized version of the Spanish RGSS pension rules. 1985 system.
Provision Expression De¯nitions
¿m is the ERA
Elegibility ¿ ¸ ¿m = 60 a(¿) ¸ 15 a(.) denotes
years of contributions
cx;cm are respectively the
Covered wages c(t) = minfcx(t);maxfw(t);cm(t)gg Max and Min. covered wage
c(t) denotes contributions
w(¿) is the bene¯t base
Bene¯t Base w(¿) = (1=R)
P¿
¿¡R c(t)dt R: length of the averaging
period (8 in 1995)




®0 if ¿ < ¿m
®0 + ®1(¿ ¡ ¿m) if ¿m · ¿ · ¿N
1 otherwise
¿N is the NRA
®0 = :60
®1 = :08




·0 if a(¿) < 15




b(t;¿) is the pre-tax pension
Pension b(t;¿) = minfbx(t);maxf®(¿)·(a(¿))w(¿);bm(t;¿)gg bx is the maximum pension
bm is the minimum pension
Further Maximum contributions and pensions are constant in real terms
assumptions The minimum pension real growth rate or generosity is 0.5 %.
² We assume all individuals in the sample share the same survival probabilities, estimated
from the 1995, National Statistics Institute (INE) mortality data.
² We include in our simulations a stylized version of the pension rules in the Spanish General
Regime. The parameter values are those in e®ect before the 1997 reform (the estimation
sample is the 1995 cross section of HLSS). These values are presented in Table 1.
We implement the estimation procedure in three economies of increasing institutional
complexity. The ¯rst one, E1, only includes the pension rules relevant for the \average"








On top of this we consider a second economy, E2, in which there is a minimum guaranteed
income level (bm) available for workers older than the ERA. We refer to the rate of real
growth of the minimum pension as the generosity of the system. Finally, on the top
of E2 we specify the economy E3, in which there is a unique maximum pension, and a
minimum and maximum level of contributions, which vary across individuals according to
their professional quali¯cation. The comparison of the results under E2 and E3 will allow
us to evaluate the marginal contribution of this last group of pension rules in explaining
the empirical retirement patterns.
² The base value for our constant interest rate is 3%.
² The other components of the vector of observable information xi (wages, education and
labor history) are used to compute the marginal utility Á¤(ti) for every individual in the
sample. The key part for this task is to construct, for each individual in the sample,
a smoothed life-cycle pro¯le of labor earnings compatible with the observed information
from 1986 to 1995. This is crucial in estimating the wages, pensions and wealth of each
individual in the sample. The details are provided in appendix D and further explained
in Boldrin et al. (2004).
4.3 Estimation Results
The set of parameters which best ¯ts the retirement behavior of the individuals in our sample
for each economy is reproduced in Table 2. In order to evaluate the ¯t of the model we report
a pseudo-R2 that compares the ¯t of each speci¯cation with respect to the constant only model
with ¯xed preference parameters (± = 0 and ´ = 1). The aggregate hazard predicted by our
theoretical model under this set of parameters is shown in Figure 6. The parameter estimates
under the more \realistic" economy E3 reveal the following properties about individual prefer-
ences: (1) a low degree of relative risk aversion to life uncertainty; (2) Individuals seems to be
extremely patient, showing a clearly negative time discount factor; and (3) the relative value
of leisure varies signi¯cantly with age and education: highly educated people value leisure less,
and this value grows with age at a slower rate.
Neither of these ¯ndings should come as a surprise, as all of them have already been reported
in previous structural estimations. A negative discount factor as well as a small degree of risk
aversion are key ¯ndings in Hurd (1989).15 This comparison is particularly important, as his
15In Hurd's paper, which only includes uncertainty regarding the life span, ´= 1.12 and ±=-0.01. In Gustman
and Steinmeier (2002), where the rate of time preference is heterogeneous, the estimated value of ´ is 1.26. The
comparison with models including other sources of uncertainty is less straightforward. The estimated values
are, however, relatively close: in Rust and Phelan (1987) (where several sources of uncertainty are included) the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1=´) is found to be 0.93; in French (2005) (where both income and health
are uncertain) the estimated value is ´ =1.42. In Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) deterministic model, 1=´ is








Table 2: Pseudo ML non-linear Probit estimates (N = 16359)
Economy E1 E2 E3
^ µ t-ratio ^ µ t-ratio ^ µ t-ratio
º0 -8.478 -318.91 -8.084 -542.01 -8.439 -565.00
ºe 5.156 250.14 1.654 110.91 3.541 237.07
ºet -0.128 -60.99 -0.047 -3.17 -0.090 -6.05
ºt 0.224 308.36 0.205 13.73 0.214 14.32
ºs 0.841 20.87 0.748 50.17 0.712 47.65
± -0.007 -3.06 -0.043 -2.90 -0.037 -2.45
´ 0.644 35.13 0.995 66.74 1.016 68.01
lnl -4839.594 -4494.832 -4482.236
pseudo ¡ R2@ 0.0959 0.1603 0.1627







































































































































Figure 6: Fitted retirement hazard (H) and cumulative distribution (F) vs sample averages by








estimations are obtained from a life-cycle model which is very close to ours. The main di®erence
is that Hurd's results stem from the model's predictions about optimal savings, while ours come
from the implications of the model in terms of optimal retirement. In Hurd's paper, a negative
± helps the model to reproduce the observed amounts of accumulated assets at advanced ages.
In our work the degree of time impatience determines the sign and magnitude of the incentives
provided by the pension regulations. Very patient workers value the ¯nancial gains stemming
from delayed retirement a great deal. This keeps them active until the NRA, unless minimum
pensions block this incentive. Therefore, a negative ± emerges in our estimations as a form to
express the high attachment to the labor force shown by average and above average Spanish
wage-earners.
Highly educated workers usually have better working conditions and more pleasant occupa-
tions, which result in a higher attachment to activity. Our extremely stylized model has only one
way to re°ect these facts: by lowering the estimated relative value of leisure for these workers.
On the other hand, a pattern of strong increase in leisure value as individuals grow older is quite
common in the literature (see for instance Gustman and Steinmeier (1986)).
The adjustment of the model
The life cycle approach is well suited to our purpose of exploring the incentives provided by
the pension regulation, but it is far from being a complete theory of retirement. It is clear
that recursive models may provide a more comprehensive ground for empirical analysis. The
estimation of our life cycle model is, however, a very valuable experiment as it gives us a set
of parameters values that are fully consistent with our theoretical model. Furthermore, the
estimation gives a chance to test the empirical performance of the life cycle theory. This is
summarized in the third column of Figure 6, where the estimated cumulative distribution and
hazard by age are compared to their empirical counterparts.
Loosely speaking, the life cycle model does a rather satisfactory job at reproducing the
empirical retirement distribution. Summing up, we observe that our base model (E3): (1) slightly
overestimates retirement °ows immediately before 60; (2) reproduces a spike in retirement °ows
at 60, but its size is a bit lower than that in the data; (3) overstates the number of people
retiring immediately before the Normal retirement age; and, ¯nally, generates a large spike at
the NRA, although, again, it is of a smaller magnitude than the empirical one. The relatively
high post-65 hazards found are entirely due to the very small predicted probability of survival
in the labor force beyond the NRA. The probability of retirement at those ages is actually very
small and decreasing.
That we do not fully reproduce the size of the peaks is easy to understand as some rele-
vant economic processes are missed in our stylized life-cycle model. First, there is no health
uncertainty or unemployment shocks. Clearly, both factors can contribute to the age 60 spike:








pension may well decide to keep working till the retirement bene¯t ¯rst becomes available. A
similar story could be applied to people who have been ¯red before 60: they could stay active
claiming the unemployment bene¯t and start collecting the pension as soon as possible. The
underestimation of the age 65 peak could stem from the combination of institutional factors (col-
lective agreement clauses) and ¯rms decisions. In absence of these elements, our model tends to
shift some of the retirement °ows from the NRA to the ages immediately before 65.
From our sequence of simulations (E1 to E3) we extract two relevant implications. Firstly,
the comparison between E1 and E2 con¯rms that the economy without minimum pensions (E1)
is utterly incapable of reproducing the empirical patterns of pre-retirement (withdrawals before
or at the ERA) and early retirement (before 65). And, secondly, the coincidence between the
estimated hazard for economies E2 and E3 identi¯es the minimum pension as the key factor
shaping early retirement patterns, and play down the role of maximum pension and min/max
of contributions.
We showed in section 2.2 that the age-60 retirement peak is basically due to the behavior of
low income workers. To test the ability of the model to reproduce this observation we compare
in ¯gure 7 the retirement hazard by age in the data and in the model, for three wage groups (de-
limited by the 1/3 and 2/3 quantiles of earnings: 1.58 and 2.60 million pesetas respectively). We
can appreciate how the life cycle model (once equipped with the minimum pension mechanism)
successfully reproduces this empirical regularity.
Finally, and as a token of curiosity, we have compared the predicting power of a reduced
form probit including the same information we use in our structural estimation experiment.16
Figure 8 shows the results: the overall predicting power of the probit is very limited, and its
performance is extremely poor at capturing the discontinuities in the data. This comparison
provides further evidence (see Lumsdaine et al. (1992) for an early elaboration of this idea)
of the potential advantages of using an explicit economic theory in order to explain empirical
patterns.
5 Simulation results
5.1 Impact of the minimum pension scheme on retirement and welfare
To quantify the impact of the minimum pension scheme on the aggregate distribution of re-
tirement ages we simulated the economies with and without the guaranteed minimum scheme
(economies E1 and E3, respectively) and compared their predictions in terms of retirement be-
havior. Note that, in order to isolate the e®ect of the change in the institutional structure, we
performed this comparison with ¯xed preference parameters (ie, the parameters estimated under
E3). Figure 9 illustrates our ¯ndings while Table 5 in appendix E provides additional details.
16In addition to the set of linear regressors already considered in the non-linear model, we have included the















































































































































Figure 7: Retirement hazard by age and wage level in the three institutional environments
considered (Economies E1 to E3). The wage levels (W1 to W3) are delimited by the percentiles




























55 60 65 70
age
sample hazard est. probit hazard
Figure 8: Hazard out of the labor force: sample vs. predictions form a probit model using the












































55 60 65 70
age
with MP without MP
Figure 9: Simulated aggregate retirement probabilities by age in the economies with and without
the minimum pension scheme. Both simulations are carried out using the preference parameters
estimated for economy E3.
It is most apparent from Figure 9 that the minimum pension scheme alters the shape of the
retirement distribution in a fundamental way, shifting substantial amounts of probability mass
from 65 and the immediately preceding early retirement ages (between 61 and 64) to the ERA
of 60. As minimum pensions carry the retirement age of large groups of individuals forward, the
distribution changes from a uni-modal shape (with a single peak at 65) to a bi-modal one (with
peaks at both 60 and 65). More precisely:
² There is a rather small increase in the incidence of pre-retirement (withdrawals before
or at the ERA): the unconditional retirement probability with the minimum pension is
higher at every age before 60. This results in a 2 % increase in the retirement probability
accumulated at the age of 59.
² A remarkable spike emerges at the age of 60, as the probability of retiring exactly at the
ERA almost triples (6.6% in E1 vs. 18.0 % in E3).
² Increases in the incidence of pre-retirement are mirrored by decreases in retirement after
the ERA. Early retirement before 65 experiences a 15.5% reduction, while retirement at
the NRA goes down by 30%. Overall, the introduction of the minimum pension implies a
10% increase in the occurrence of early and pre- retirement.
All in all, the introduction of minimum pensions (together with the other caps and ceilings
included in E3) reduces the average retirement age by four months, from 63.0 to 62.66 years.








Most changes occur at the lowest end of the income distribution, as ¯gure 7 in the preceding
section makes clear. The retirement behavior of median and high income workers is largely
una®ected by the institutional change involved by shifting form E1 to E3.
5.1.1 Welfare impact of the minimum pension scheme
Low income workers, then, are the principal bene¯ciaries of the minimum pension scheme. Ar-
guably this comes at the price of higher average contributions for the overall working population,
emphasizing the distinctive redistributive character of this piece of the pension regulations.17 It
is clear that both e®ects should be accounted for by any measure of the average welfare impact
of minimum pensions. In this paper we assess the welfare e®ect by computing a compensated
equivalent variation that keeps constant the average generosity of the system (in terms of its
implicit internal rate of return). More precisely, we proceed as follows: 18
1. Evaluate the generosity of the current system by computing its average internal rate of
return r.
2. Compute the contribution rate needed to keep r constant in a system without minimum
pensions (and letting individual adjust their optimal life cycle behavior to the new insti-
tutional environment).
3. Compute the equivalent variation associated with the presence of minimum pensions, but
keeping the average generosity constant.
Proceeding in this way we ¯nd that the average welfare gain produced by minimum pensions
is not very large: it amounts to approximately 0.6% of the life-cycle consumption of the median
worker in the economy. This low ¯gure is, of course, the result of the cancelation of e®ects of
opposite sign for di®erent individuals. The gain for a low income worker that retires at the age
of 60 is a substantial 3.3% of his/her life-cycle consumption. For a worker of average earnings
that stays active till 65 the losses from higher contributions amount to almost 1% of his/her
life-cycle consumption. The detailed results can be checked in Table 6 of appendix F. Note that
these ¯gures are extremely sensitive to changes in the growth rate of the minimum pensions.
In our benchmark simulation we assume a future growth rate of 0.5%, which is signi¯cantly
smaller than the average for the 1985/2004 interval. Had we extrapolated the historical ¯gures,
we would have found a much larger welfare impact: an average equivalent variation of 3.6%,
and welfare gains as large as 13% of life-cycle consumption for early retirees.
17In our framework, the redistributive role of minimum pensions is dominant, as the absence of health shocks
eliminate the potencial e±ciency gains of early withdrawals form the labor force and unemployment bene¯ts.








5.2 Early retirement and borrowing constraints
In this section we explore what arguably is the main drawback of the life cycle setting: the
very minor role played by credit restrictions. In section 5.2.1 we show that credit constraints
hardly a®ect optimal retirement patterns in our benchmark model (ie, when decisions are taken
early in the life-cycle by agents with a homogenous discount factor). Things may be di®erent
in a population with heterogenous ±, as this would endogenously generate credit-constrained
individuals who may early retire in absence of minimum pensions. This possibility is explored
in section 5.2.2. We ¯nd that the quantitative bias introduced by this possibility in our main
results is small.
5.2.1 The impact of the borrowing constraint in our benchmark model
Table 3: Optimal retirement with and without credit restrictions: Predicted cumulative distri-
bution (F) in our model economy with perfect credit markets (PKM) and borrowing constraints
(BC). The simulations are carried out using the parameters estimated under economy E3.
Age F(BC) F(PKM) Age F(BC) F(PKM)
55 0.0 0.0 63 0.567 0.564
56 0.017 0.018 64 0.659 0.654
57 0.045 0.046 65 0.750 0.743
58 0.088 0.090 66 0.929 0.929
59 0.151 0.154 67 0.952 0.952
60 0.233 0.237 68 0.968 0.968
61 0.413 0.418 69 0.980 0.980
62 0.484 0.486 70 0.988 0.988
In this section we explore the role of credit constraints in our benchmark model. This is done
by performing a simple experiment: comparing the optimal behavior in a model with perfect
credit markets with that in our benchmark framework.19 The results of such a comparison
are displayed in Table 3 (appendix C presents some additional theoretical details). They make
it clear that the presence of borrowing constraints has a very minor impact on the predicted
retirement behavior. In absence of any form of recursive uncertainty, it is actually optimal for
individuals with a high propensity for early retirement to accumulate enough assets to leave
the labor force before the pension is available. In other words, in a world where life span is
the only source of uncertainty, borrowing constraints do not signi¯cantly alter the incentives to
retire early, even after accounting for the strong saving e®ort it imposes at early stages of the
19The optimal retirement behavior in the presence of perfect capital markets has been frequently described
in the literature (eg Sheshinski (1978), Kahn (1988), Samwick (1998)). This situation can be envisaged as a
particular case of our model in section 3.1, when the ¯rst binding age for the credit constraint t is the maximum








life cycle. This means that the presence of recursive uncertainty (i.e. health, unemployment or
income shocks) is instrumental for making the credit constraints the key factor after the intense
retirement °ows observed at the ERA (as emphasized in eg. French (2005)).
Alternatively, a life-cycle model without recursive uncertainty may produce an age-60 spike
if very impatient individuals were included in it. Those individuals optimally accumulate little
wealth along their working careers and are, consequently, strongly credit constrained in the years
immediately before ERA. In these circumstances, they have no real option to retire until the
public pension is ¯rst available. Furthermore, very impatient individuals are not much a®ected
by the strong forces retaining workers at that particular age (stemming basically from increases
in the future pension, recall section 3.2), as they discount these future gains strongly.20 These
two observations together suggest that these workers may ¯nd it optimal to retire at 60 even in
absence of minimum pensions. This possibility is quantitatively evaluated in the next section.
5.2.2 Early retirement with heterogeneity in the discount factor







Figure 10: Aggregate retirement hazard with (-) and without (- -) minimum pensions in the
economy with heterogenous discount factor.
The target is to measure the magnitude of retirement °ows at ERA when there is hetero-
geneity in the degree of time preference. As this cannot be done within our estimation sample,
we carry out a simulation exercise based on the EFF-02, the only available database including
detailed information about asset holdings. The experiment involves two di®erent calculations:
1. Evaluate the dispersion of ± in the Spanish population.
20This can be checked by exploring the equation (6) or, more simply, the expression in footnote 11. Take note
that for these type of workers t equals the retirement age and, consequently, ± is the relevant discount factor for








We undertake a revealed preference experiment in the tradition of Gustman and Steinmeier
(2002). We infer the population distribution of ± by combining our model's predictions in
terms of assets holdings and the empirical data in EFF-02. The essence of the procedure is
that low levels of accumulated assets reveal a high degree of time preference. The details,
including kernel estimates of the discount factor, are presented in appendix G.
2. We simulate the optimal retirement behavior in the economy with heterogeneous discount
factors.21 In particular, we measure to what extent the existence of a signi¯cant group
of credit constrained individuals contributes to a spike of retirement at the age of 60 (in
absence of minimum pensions).
We ¯nd a small increase in the incidence of retirement at the ERA in the economy without
minimum pensions: the hazard grows from 0.16 at 59 to 0.19 at 60 (¯gure 10 illustrates the
results). This is less than one third the increase observed with minimum pensions. This means
that the incidence of credit constraints (as revealed by the data on asset holdings) is not large
enough to make a big contribution to early retirement in Spain. We may conclude, then, that
the quantitative bias induced by this omitted e®ect in our benchmark calculation is small. Thus,
our basic ¯nding about the contribution of minimum pensions to early retirement seems robust.
5.3 Reform Analysis
Our calibrated life-cycle model is a valuable tool to explore the partial equilibrium e®ects of
policy changes. In this section we focus on changes in the pension regulations that have been
recently introduced or are currently under debate in Spain. In particular, we simulate the
following modi¯cations to our base case economy [E3]:
REFORM A: The number of years of contribution included in the bene¯t base is increased
from 8, as prescribed by the 1985 legislation, to 15 years, as prescribed in the 1997 reform.
REFORM B: We introduce two changes in the way pensions and contributions are worked
out. On the one hand, we add a 2 % annual premium for extending contributive careers
beyond age 65 to the pension formula in Table 4.2. The formal expression of the new age
penalty after 65 changes to 1+0:02(¿ ¡¿m). On the other hand, workers who stay in the
labor force after the \normal" retirement age (65) are exempted of paying the employee
part of social contributions. (6.4 % of the covered wages). These changes were the core of
the modi¯cation in pension law approved in 2002.
REFORM C: We change the elegibility conditions of the minimum bene¯ts to make them
only available at the normal retirement age of 65.
21To maximize the role played by credit constraints we avoid using the long term predictions of our life-cycle
model. Instead, we solve the model using current information on wages and assets. This forces as to introduce








REFORM D: The combination of reforms B and C.
The changes in retirement behavior generated by the proposed policies can be appreciated in
Figure 11. The change in the length of the pension averaging period in Reform A has virtually no
e®ect on retirement patterns. In contrast, the other two reforms have signi¯cant consequences.
The age 65 peak in retirement °ows entirely disappears under Reform B. Most workers who
would have previously retired at the NRA ¯nd it more advantageous to stay in the labor force
under the new incentive scheme. Overall, 16 % of the population remains at work after 65 with
the new regulation (7.1% in the base case), and the average retirement age goes up by more
than a year and a half (from 62.66 to 64.46 years). As expected, policy C, the suppression of the
minimum bene¯t between 60 and 64 is e®ective in reducing pre-retirement and early retirement.
It reduces accumulated retirement at 60 by 7.1 percentage points (from 41.2% to 34.1%)and
increases the average retirement age by almost 2 months. This means that roughly 50% of the
total behavioral response generated by minimum pensions can be overturned by delaying its
age of ¯rst entitlement. Finally, the combination of policies C and D, results in the complete
removal of the peaks at the ERA and the NRA, and larger delays in the average retirement age
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Figure 11: E®ects of reforms A to D in retirement probabilities (f). The simulations are carried









The minimum pension scheme is one of the largest programs of the Spanish Old Age pension
system. It provides substantial income support for a large number of Spanish pensioners, which
has gained it widespread popularity. The e±ciency properties of this mechanism, however, have
received little attention so far. In this paper we both quantify the welfare impact of minimum
pensions and study the magnitude of the distortions generated by this piece of regulation on
retirement behavior. We undertake this analysis with the help of a stylized life cycle model,
which allows for a very convenient analytical characterization of the optimality conditions, and
which can be solved with much less computational e®ort than what is needed with a standard
Dynamic Programming model. We use this model as the data generating process in a structural
estimation experiment, ¯nding that our stylized model provides a rather good approximation of
empirical retirement behavior, using a minimum amount of information.
Once these maximum likelihood estimations are fed into the model, we are left with a fully
operative tool for policy analysis. Our main experiment is a quantitative evaluation of the
impact of the minimum pension on early retirement. We ¯nd that the incidence of retirement
at the age of ¯rst entitlement (60) almost triples with respect to that in the economy without
minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger with
minimum pensions. We check that these ¯ndings are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneity
in the discount factor (ie, in situation where the role of credit constraints is much reinforced).
We also explore the impact of several policy changes already implemented or currently under
debate in Spain.
Our ¯ndings make it clear that minimum pensions should receive more attention in the cur-
rent debate about the reform of the pension system in Spain (or any country with a similar
system). It is clearly a contradiction to discuss changes aimed at fostering older workers' labor
participation and, at the same time, to ignore the strong disincentive e®ects of minimum pen-
sions. We conclude with a few remarks about some drawbacks of the current experiment and
some future lines of research. Firstly, the magnitude of the behavioral changes induced by the
minimum pensions is high enough for general equilibrium e®ects to be sizeable. An evaluation
of the quantitative importance of these e®ects would be desirable (see S¶ anchez-Mart¶ ³n (2002))
for a ¯rst evaluation in an OLG context). A second aspect of our model that demands a serious
reconsideration is the absence of any form of recursive uncertainty. Health and unemployment
shocks are particularly well worth considering, as they can have a strong in°uence on retirement
decisions in economies with imperfect insurance. Extending the life-cycle model to include these
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A The solution of the individual problem
In section 3 we show how the original constrained problem in (1) is transformed into the un-
constrained one in (2). This new problem is dealt with in three stages. In the next section we
review how to analytically characterize the optimal pro¯les of consumption and accumulated
assets for a given retirement age and a given binding age for the credit constraint. In section
A.2 we show how to use these conditional solutions to compute the optimal binding age for any
given retirement age.
A.1 The conditional consumption/savings problem
When both the retirement, ¿, and the wealth depletion age, t, are ¯xed, a straightforward
application of Optimal Control Theory allows for a complete characterization of the optimal
conditional consumption function c¿(:jt) (ie, the solution to problem (2)). 22 Omitting the
dependence on ¿ and t to make notation easier, the Hamiltonian of the system is:
H(a(t);c(t);¸(t);t;¿) = e¡~ ±(t) [u(c(t)) + º(l¿(t))] + ¸(t)(ra(t) + ~ w(t) ¡ c(t))




´ e¡± t du
dc
(c(t)) ¡ ¸(t) = 0 (12)
@ H(x(t);t;¿)
@ a(t)
´ r¸(t) = ¡_ ¸(t) (13)
_ a(t) = ra(t) + ~ w(t) ¡ c(t) (14)
a(t0) = a0 ; a(t) = 0 (15)
It is easy to check that these conditions are also su±cient for our problem. To get to expression
(17) we proceed as follows:
1. We integrate (13) to obtain ¸(t) as a function of ¸(t0) (just ¸ in our notation). If this is
particularized in (12), we obtain:
e¡~ ±(t) du
dc
(c(t)) = ¸e¡r t (16)
2. If we integrate (14) we obtain the conditional Intertemporal Budget constraint (IBC).
22Our problem di®ers from the standard formulation (as stated in eg. ?), pag 165, or ?), pag 84) due to the
existence of a couple of discontinuities in the retirement age. The ¯rst one appears in the objective function, as
a result of the leisure component; while the second one shows up in the system's dynamic equation, stemming
from the pension rules. The optimality conditions are, however, standard as all the relevant regularity conditions








3. If we further restrict ourselves to the CES case, u(c) = c1¡´=(1 ¡ ´), we can express
the optimal conditional consumption c(t) as an explicit function of ¸ from (16). This,
in turn, can be particularized in the conditional IBC. Obtaining the optimal conditional




Y (¿;t) with Cc(t) =
Z t
t0
e¡r (t¡t0) [S(t)d(t)]° dt (17)
where ° stands for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ° = 1=´, d(t) = e(r¡±)(t¡t0)
is the net discounted factor, Cc(t) is an integrating constant (ensuring that the present
discounted values of earnings and consumption are equal), and Y (¿;t) is the Conditional
Life-cycle Wealth:
Y (¿;t) = a0 +
Z ¿
t0
e¡r (t¡t0) w(t)(1 ¡ &)dt +
Z t
^ ¿
e¡r (t¡t0) b(t;¿)dt (18)
Expressions (17) and (18) make it easy to study the dependence of optimal consumption on
individual preferences, life cycle income and the survival pro¯le, given a speci¯c institutional
environment. They also allow the optimal conditional consumption pro¯le to be calculated very
quickly.
As the survival probability eventually goes to zero as age increases, the optimal conditional
consumption pro¯le must be eventually decreasing. Intuitively, there must be an age t¤ where
the constant or increasing pension bene¯ts equal the decreasing conditional consumption, i.e.
c¿(t¤ jt) = b(¿). Assume we represent this relation via the function h¿(t). Of course, there is no
guarantee that t¤ ´ h¿(t) = t for an arbitrary wealth depletion age t. As we show in the next
paragraph, this condition de¯nes the \optimal" binding age for the credit constraint. Therefore,
¯nding the right unconditional optimal consumption function (for every retirement age) requires
¯nding the unique ¯x point of h¿(:).
A.2 The Optimal binding age for the credit constrain
If we particularize the previous optimal conditional consumption function c¿(tjt) in problem
(2) objective function, we are left with the following \concentrated" problem, which provides
the optimal wealth depletion age for a given retirement age:
max V (t) =
R t
t0 e¡~ ±(t)u(c¿(tjt)) dt +
R T
t e¡~ ±(t)u(b(t;¿)) dt
t 2 [^ ¿;T]
Given ¿; c¿(tjt) : [t0;t] ! R+ and ^ ¿ = maxf¿m;¿g
(19)
Under our assumptions, the solution to this problem coincides with the intuitive proposal
we stated at the end of the previous section: the optimal t is implicitly de¯ned as a ¯xed point
of the function h¿(:)
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Figure 12: Optimal wealth depletion age t, and optimal life cycle behavior (consumption, savings
and accumulated assets) for the Spanish economy's median worker in case of retirement at the
age of 60.
This is easily established from the ¯rst order condition of the problem:
(dV =dt)(t
¤) ´ e¡~ ±(t
¤)Ã(t
¤) = 0
where: Ã(t) = ¸(¿;t) e¡r t [c¿(t jt) ¡ b(¿)] + u(c¿(t jt)) ¡ u(b(¿))
Under concavity of the utility function, the only root to this equation is obtained from
condition (20). This result was established in ?). The second order su±cient condition is
guaranteed by a monotone decreasing conditional consumption on t, c¿(tjt). This condition
is satis¯ed when the net discount factor grows faster in t than the lagrange multiplier, i.e.
e(±¡r)t¸(t) is monotone increasing, which is the usual case. Finally, when c¿(^ ¿j^ ¿) < b(¿) the
optimal solution is the corner t = ^ ¿, as Ã(t) < 0 8t 2 [¿;T]). In practice, we obtained the
optimal t by applying a root ¯nding routine to the equation t ¡ h¿(t) in the interval [^ ¿;T).23
Figure 12 displays the basic qualitative properties of the optimal t (as a function of
retirement age ) and the life-cycle pro¯les of consumption and savings for a Representative
Agent (RA) of the Spanish economy.24 We see that although consumption grows for most of the
individual's life, it eventually starts to decrease, leading to a rather advanced wealth depletion
23There can be corner solutions (t = ^ ¿) to the problem if c¿(^ ¿ j ^ ¿) < b(^ ¿).
24To illustrate the qualitative properties of optimal behavior, we construct representative agents for both average








age. Therefore, the credit constraint becomes binding only for the very elderly. Median workers
accumulate assets right after the entrance into the labor market, and start depleting assets only
after retirement.
B General expressions for the marginal utility of working
The general procedure to obtain the analytical expression for the marginal utility of working at
any age ¿ is as follows:
1. Di®erentiate the expression of E[V ] in (1) with respect to both ¿ and consumption.
2. Particularize the ¯rst order condition of the optimal consumption problem (16) and group
all terms containing dc¿=d¿.
3. Di®erentiate the conditional intertemporal budget constraint with respect to ¿ and gather
all the terms containing dc¿=d¿.
4. Particularize the expression in step 3 into the general equation obtained in step 2. In this
way we disposed of the term containing the consumption derivative, and we are left with
a general analytical expression for optimal retirement.
The general expression (omitting the leisure component) when there are no minimum pen-
sions is:
dV
d¿ (¿) = ¸(¿;t)d(¿)[w(¿)(1 ¡ &) ¡ I(¿ = ^ ¿)I(^ ¿ < t)b + b0 A(^ ¿;t)+
e¡r (t¡¿)(I(^ ¿ < t)b ¡ c(t)) dt
d¿ ]+
e
~ ±(¿)¡~ ±(t) (u(c) ¡ u(b)) dt
d¿ + b0 u0(b)A±(^ t;T)
where t = t(¿), b = b(¿); b0 = b0(¿), c(:) = c¿(:jt), d(t) = e(r¡±)(t¡t0), A(^ ¿;t) =
R t
^ ¿ e¡r t dt and
A±(t;T) =
R T
t e¡~ ±(t) dt. When the pension system includes a guarantee minimum the expression
becomes a bit more complicated:
dV
d¿ (¿) = ¸(¿;t;J)d(¿)[w(¿)(1 ¡ &) ¡ I(¿ = ^ ¿)I(^ ¿ < t)b + b0 A(^ ¿;t)+
e¡r (t¡¿)(I(^ ¿ < t)b ¡ c(t)) dt
d¿ ]+
e
~ ±(¿)¡~ ±(J) (I(t < J)u(b) ¡ I(J < T)u(bmJ) dJ
d¿ +
e
~ ±(¿)¡~ ±(t) (u(c) ¡ I(t < J)u(b)) dt
d¿+
b0 u0(b)A±(t;J)
where J = J(¿) is the age when the minimum pension becomes binding.
the 10th percentile of the empirical distribution in 1994 wave from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP). The survival probabilities and all the other environmental parameters are identical to those used in
the estimation of the model (see section 4.2). The preference parameters employed are our maximum likelihood






















Figure 13: Marginal utility of working with (-) and without (- -) credit constraint. Representative
(median) agent.












Figure 14: Marginal utility of working with (-) and without (- -) credit constraint. Agent in the








C Optimal retirement with and without credit constraints
Figures 13 and 14 reproduce the marginal utility from continuous work for our median and
low-earnings representative agents, in two institutional environments: with and without credit
constraints. It is apparent from the graphs that the presence of liquidity restrictions does not
have an important e®ect on retirement incentives. We can safely conclude that the key force
giving shape to the marginal utility from working is the pension regulations. Changes in the
credit availability have hardly any impact on the incentives to work according to age. The most
noticeable change is a signi¯cant reduction in the incentive to keep active in the age range 61/64
for average income workers. This stems from a combination of income (life-cycle wealth increases
and ¸ decreases) and substitution e®ects (drops in y0). This implies that, contrary to the usual
conjecture, credit constraints slightly foster early-retirement (between 61 and 64) rather than
pre-retirement (60 and before).
D HLSS Database
Our main microeconomic data set is based on administrative records from the Spanish Social
Security Administration (HLSS: Historiales Laborales de la Seguridad Social). The sample con-
sists of 250,000 individual work histories randomly drawn from the historical ¯les of SS a±liates
(Fichero Hist¶ orico de A¯liados). It includes individuals aged 40+ on July 31, 1998, the date at
which the ¯les were prepared. The sample contains individuals from the General Regime and
all the Special regimes but excludes Central Government employees.
The data set consists of three ¯les. The ¯rst ¯le (\History ¯le", or H ¯le) contains the work
history of the individuals in the sample. Each record in this ¯le describes a single employment
spell of the individual. These work histories are very accurate for spells or histories which
began after the mid{1960s. The second ¯le (\Covered Earnings ¯le", or CE ¯le) contains
(annual averages) of covered earnings from 1986 to 1995. The third ¯le (\Bene¯ts ¯le") contains
information on the SS bene¯ts received by the individuals in the sample.
For each individual in the sample who contributed to SS during the 1986-1995 period, the
CE ¯le reports the annual average of covered earnings together with the contributions paid. For
individuals enrolled in either the General Regime or the Coal Miners Regime, covered earnings
are a doubly censored (from above and below) version of earnings. What this means is that
covered earnings have both ceilings and °oors: contributions must be paid over some legislated
minimum wage, no matter what actual earnings are. Further, earnings above a certain legislated
ceilings are not covered, that is, they do not generate any future right and, as such, are not
reported in the CE ¯le.
For each employment spell in the H ¯le, we know the age, sex and marital status of the person
(not reliable), the duration of the spell (in days), the type of contract (either part-time or full-








of the spell, the sector of employment (4-digits SIC), and the region of residence (52 Spanish
provinces). We restrict our empirical analysis to the sample of male workers enroled in the
General Regime in 1995, that have been working continuously from 1986 to 1994. Descriptive
statistics of the variables employed are presented in table D. We refer to Boldrin et al. (2004)
for a more detailed description of the variables in the HLSS ¯les.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics
by education Total Edu high Edu low
# observations: 16359 1472 14887
mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
%retiring .122 .328 .0822 .274 .1268 .332
High education .0899 .286 | | | |
Age 58.90 2.96 59.28 3.33 58.86 2.92
Receipt temporary bene¯ts .3272 .469 .1637 .370 .343 .474
Years of contribution 31.4 5.72 31.76 5.53 31.44 5.73
Wagea 2.420 1.56 4.502 2.25 2.215 1.31
Bene¯t basea 2.17 1.02 3.553 1.17 2.030 .897
Theoretical Bene¯ta 1.33 .728 2.246 .947 1.244 .635
E®ective bene¯ta .627 .930 1.17 1.49 .5730 .835
by age group 55{59 60{64 65+
# observations: 9970 5716 673
mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
%retiring .0342 .181 .206 .405 .7221 .448
High education .0818 .270 .0970 .296 .1500 .357
Age 56.91 1.48 61.58 1.39 65.53 1.16
Receipt temporary bene¯ts .3118 .463 .3497 .476 .3655 .481
Years of contribution 29.85 5.25 33.90 5.40 34.69 6.27
Wagea 2.471 1.61 2.362 1.47 2.165 1.50
Bene¯t basea 2.169 1.03 2.192 .995 2.092 1.11
Theoretical Bene¯ta 1.178 .601 1.528 .770 2.007 1.12
E®ective bene¯ta | | 1.558 .741 2.018 1.11
a: (in 106 1995 pta)
Earnings distribution, earnings histories and projections
As commented in the previous section, we do not observe earnings directly but only covered
earnings (i.e. a doubly censored version of earnings). To deal with the top-censoring problem,
we proceed as follows. First we estimate a Tobit model for (log) covered earnings. Then we use
the estimated parameters to impute the earnings of the censored observations and estimate an
earning function using imputed earnings for those a®ected by the ceilings. Finally, we gener-
ate \true earnings" for all the individuals in the top censored groups, by using the estimated
regression function and adding an individual random noise component.
From the individual pro¯le of covered earnings ct between year 1986 and year 1995 = T
we impute the individual pro¯le of \true" real earnings (wt, t = 1986;:::;1995). Given this
information, we \smoothly" project earnings forward and backward in the following way:








the function g(¢) corrects the growth of log earnings imputable to age a and is de¯ned as:
g(aT+k) = ¯1 ¤ aT+k + ¯2 ¤ a2
T+k ¡ ¯1 ¤ aT ¡ ¯2 ¤ a2
T:
The ¯ are the estimated coe±cients from a pooled LS regression, the details of which are
available upon request. The correction is speci¯c for each combination of sex and contributive
group. In summary, we project backward and forward using the wage in 1995 as a point of
support. However the results from our exercise are robust to an earnings pro¯le which combines
observed information from 1986 to 1995 and project earnings for the rest of the period. Again,
the results of this exercise are available upon request.
E Impact of minimum pensions on retirement
Table 5 provides detailed results of our main experiment: the comparison of the aggregate
retirement distribution with and without the minimum pension scheme.
Table 5: Probability of retirement between ages t and t+1, f(t); cumulative probability, F(t);
and retirement hazard, h(t), in two institutional environments: E1 (without minimum pensions)
and E3 (with minimum pension). P3 denotes parameters estimated under economy E3.
age f(E1,P3) f(E3,P3) F(E1,P3) F(E3,P3) h(E1,P3) h(E3,P3)
55 0.011 0.017 0.0 0.0 0.011 0.017
56 0.020 0.027 0.011 0.017 0.020 0.028
57 0.040 0.043 0.030 0.045 0.042 0.045
58 0.061 0.063 0.071 0.088 0.066 0.069
59 0.083 0.083 0.132 0.151 0.095 0.097
60 0.066 0.180 0.215 0.233 0.085 0.234
61 0.072 0.071 0.282 0.413 0.100 0.121
62 0.096 0.082 0.353 0.484 0.149 0.160
63 0.116 0.093 0.450 0.567 0.211 0.214
64 0.115 0.091 0.566 0.659 0.265 0.267
65 0.264 0.179 0.681 0.750 0.825 0.717
66 0.018 0.023 0.944 0.929 0.326 0.322
67 0.013 0.016 0.962 0.952 0.338 0.331
68 0.009 0.012 0.975 0.968 0.381 0.371
69 0.006 0.008 0.985 0.980 0.390 0.383
70 0.015 0.020 0.991 0.988 1.0 1.0
F Welfare impact of minimum pensions
De¯nitions
Individual i-equivalent variation, µi, is the size of a parallel shift in his/her optimal consumption
pro¯le under the current system, c
mp








elimination of the minimum pension and (2) reduction in the contribution rate that keeps the
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i and &j stand for life-cycle utility, consumption, optimal retirement and con-
tribution rate under system j. The current system (j = mp) includes real-world contribution
rates and minimum pensions. In the alternative system j = ¤ minimum pensions are absent and
contributions are reduced to &¤ (a rate that guarantees the same average generosity in absence of
minimum pensions. We measure the average generosity under system j by the average internal
rate of return: rj =
R
i r(i)j dP(i), with P(i) denoting agent i measure. The r(i) are de¯ned in a
standard way (the rates that match the expected discounted value of life cycle pension bene¯ts
and contributions).
Detailed calculations
The welfare calculation involves three steps:
1. To compute the current system's average internal rate of return r we partition the sample
(active individuals aged 55 or older) according to the wage and educational levels. Each
individual is then assigned a \type" i of the I possible observable groups. The empirical
measure (weight) of each group is denoted ¹i. Recall than, on top of this observable
heterogeneity, individuals di®er in their unobservable relative value of leisure (implying
di®erent consumption paths and retirement ages for otherwise identical households). rmp
is then computed as follows:
(a) We calculate r
mp
i (¿) 8i 2 I and for each possible retirement age. This implies solving


















a stands for age-a contributions, bi
a(¿) for pension income in case of retire-
ment at ¿ and Sa is the probability of surviving to age a (conditional on surviving
till age-20).
(b) For each i 2 I, we compute the retirement probabilities predicted at every age by our
theoretical model, Pi(¿).


















2. We work out the contribution rate (&¤) that results in the same implicit average rate of
return in absence of minimum pensions. We allow individuals to change their optimal
consumption and retirement behavior during the process.
3. Finally, we compute the Equivalent Variation (µ) associated with the elimination of the
minimum pension scheme, while keeping constant the average generosity of the pension
system.
Table 6 presents the results obtained assuming the same parameter values implemented in
the paper.25 Table 7 shows that the results are very sensitive to the projected growth rate of the
minimum pensions. If their historical growth rates (roughly in line with average wages) were to
stay unchanged, their welfare impact would be much larger.
age High Education Average Education
Q 1/3 Q 2/3 Q 3/3 Q1/3 Q 2/3 Q 3/3
57.0000 2.5831 -0.1015 -0.1015 3.4899 -0.1017 -0.1017
58.0000 2.5387 -0.1021 -0.1021 3.4280 -0.1024 -0.1024
59.0000 2.4966 -0.1027 -0.1027 3.3692 -0.1030 -0.1030
60.0000 2.4568 -0.1032 -0.1032 3.3133 -0.1035 -0.1035
61.0000 -0.1016 -0.1016 -0.1016 -0.0923 -0.1020 -0.1020
62.0000 -0.1009 -0.1009 -0.1009 -0.1013 -0.1013 -0.1013
63.0000 -0.0999 -0.0999 -0.0999 -0.1003 -0.1003 -0.1003
64.0000 -0.0997 -0.0997 -0.0997 -0.1001 -0.1001 -0.1001
65.0000 -0.0990 -0.0990 -0.0990 -0.0995 -0.0995 -0.0995
Table 6: Compensated equivalent variation by age of retirement, education and wage level
(positive signs indicates welfare gains)
age High Education Average Education
Q 1/3 Q 2/3 Q 3/3 Q1/3 Q 2/3 Q 3/3
58.0000 13.5220 -0.2308 -0.2308 13.9952 -0.2314 -0.2314
59.0000 13.4186 -0.2321 -0.2321 13.7802 -0.2328 -0.2328
60.0000 13.2362 -0.2334 -0.2334 13.6807 -0.2341 -0.2341
61.0000 7.7155 -0.2298 -0.2298 8.8084 -0.2306 -0.2306
62.0000 3.3081 -0.2281 -0.2281 4.1861 -0.2289 -0.2289
63.0000 0.2378 -0.2258 -0.2258 0.9270 -0.2267 -0.2267
64.0000 -0.2222 -0.2254 -0.2254 -0.2142 -0.2263 -0.2263
65.0000 -0.2239 -0.2239 -0.2239 -0.2249 -0.2249 -0.2249
Table 7: Compensated equivalent variation projecting historical growth rates of minimum pen-
sions








G Heterogenous discount factor
To calibrate the empirical dispersion of the discount factor we proceed as follows:
(i) We summarize the empirical evidence about assets (¯nancial and real) and labor earnings
by age in the EFF-02 data via a set of parametric models. In particular, we estimate
quantile regressions of the value of accumulated assets on labor income, a logit model of
the probability of having no wealth as a function of labor earnings and quantile regressions
of labor earnings on age.
(ii) We obtain from our life-cycle model a theoretical prediction of the value of accumulated
assets and labor earnings at any particular age, conditional on an underlying discount
factor ±: a = a(±ji;w).
(iii) We make a revealed preference exercise: by inverting the function above we can always
¯nd a value of the discount factor that rationalizes any pair of observed assets holdings
and wages at any particular age. Proceeding in this way we transform the empirical
information in (i) into an estimation of the quantiles of the population distribution of the
unobserved degree of time preference. The resulting kernel density estimates (by wage
level) are illustrated in ¯gure 15




























Figure 15: Estimated distribution of the discount factor: Kernel estimation from revealed dis-
count factors in EFF-02 for labor income quantiles (5, 25, 50, 75 and 95).
Once equipped with a distribution of ± we can proceed to simulate the incidence of early
retirement in presence of credit constraints. To undertake this experiment in a context where
the role of borrowing restrictions is enhanced in as much as the life-cycle framework makes








retirement in the cross section of the EFF-02 by solving a \current" version of the model:
we solve the model from the age each individual is observed onwards, taking into account the
available information on current wages and assets. This, and the use of data from 2002, force us
to introduce some changes with respect to the calibration of the benchmark model: (1) Social
Security parameters are those in e®ect in 2002, (2) we account for observable heterogeneity
in wages and accumulated assets as described in point (i), but abstract from di®erences in
education, (3) unobservable heterogeneity in leisure preference is Normally distributed, with
variance calibrated to reproduce the incidence of early retirement in the data, and (4) a value of
the unobservable ± is assigned to each pair of wages an assets considered by using the revealed
preference procedure.
The retirement probability at age i for an individual with observables characteristics (w;a) is
Pi(a;w) = ©[Á(i;a;wj±(a;w))j¾]¡©[Á(i+1;a;w)j±(a;w)j¾], where Á(i;a;wj±) is the marginal
utility of staying active at age i for an individual with accumulated assets a, labor income w
and discount factor ±, and ©(:j¾) is the Normal CDF with standard deviation ¾. The aggregate
incidence of retirement at age i is then Pi =
R
w;a Pi(w;a)dF(w;a), with F the calibrated joint
distribution of wages and assets. Table 8 shows the results of this procedure.
Age With MP Without MP Age With MP Without MP
56 0.1484 0.1486 62 0.0347 0.0301
57 0.1541 0.1542 63 0.0837 0.0503
58 0.1577 0.1578 64 0.1775 0.0639
59 0.1614 0.1614 65 1.0682 0.7307
60 0.2673 0.194 66 0.0488 0.0185
61 0.0136 0.0116 67 0.0508 0.0231
Table 8: Simulated retirement hazard in the economy with heterogeneous discount factor. Model
predictions with and without minimum pensions.
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